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NOTES AND COMMENTS
GROUP LIBEL AND CRIMINAL LIBEL
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of expression is the lifeblood of a democratic society. Without
the right of the individual to convey his thoughts to others in the market place
of free ideas, all other freedoms would be nullified and become meaningless.
This freedom is guaranteed from governmental interference by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and by the various
state constitutions. The freedoms of speech and press, however, are not absolute;
not all speech is protected.' The area of non-protection includes defamatory mat-
ter. The scope of this article will be to examine the bounds of this non-protected
area.
REMEDIES TO AN INDIVIDUAL, INDIVIDUALLY DEFAMED
It is well settled that an individual when defamed, by word of mouth or by
the pen, has an action at law for damages. If the defamatory matter is written
and malicious, the writer is also subject to criminal prosecution in most states,
under criminal libel statutes.
CIVIL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO A MEMBER OF A DEFAMED GROUP
Defamatory statements must be "of and concerning" the plaintiff.2 A pro-
blem is thus presented when the imputation is directed at a group of persons
rather than at an individual. The courts, generally, make a rather arbitrary classi-
fication--calling large collectivities "classes", and denying a civil action by any
member of the class, and smaller collectivities "groups", and allowing recovery
by individual members of the group.3 The rationale being that the basis for civil
libel is damage to the plaintiff's reputation, and the damage becomes more highly
conjectural as the size of the group increases. 4 The courts denied recovery to an
1. See Chapinasj v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942).
2. Newell, Slander and Libel (4th Ed. 1924) sec. 539.
3. People v. Eastman, 188 N. Y. 478, 81 N. E. 459 (1907); Elwel v.
Boutwell, 138 Va. 402, 409, 121 S. E. 912, 914, (1924). See further Riesman, Demo-
cracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 Col. L. Rev. 727 (1942) and
Tannenhaus, Group Libel, 35 Cornell L. Q. 261 (1950).
4. Prosser, Law of Torts 777 (1941).
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individual member when the collectivity defamed was "the Stivers clan,"5 "the
wine joint owners," 6 "insurance agents,"7 "the officials of a named labor union," 8
"the officers of a military regiment," and "members of a jury." 10
The reasons for denying recovery have been a fear of multiplicity of suits
for the same words against the same defendant,". the difficulty of determining
damage, if any, to the individual member of the group,'2 and the desire to pro-
tect the freedoms of speech and press.' 3
"It is far better for the public welfare -that some occasional con-
sequential injury to an individual arising from general censure of his
profession, his party, or his sect should go without remedy than that free
discussion on the great question of politics, morals, or faith should go
checked by the dread of embittered and boundless litigation."'14
Recovery was allowed to an individual member when the collectivity defamed
was--"the Fenstermaker family,"'15 "the members of a named partnership,'1 6
"the staff of young doctors at a particular hospital,"'1 and "an election board."'8
If the defamatory words refer to only part of the group, or to one or several
unspecified members, plaintiff can recover if he shows that he was the person,
oz one of the persons, against whom the imputation was leveled;' 9 or that the
statement was understood by others to refer to him.2 0
An action by the group itself was unheard of at Common Law. Today, in
certain instances, a civil action can be brought in the name of the defamed group.
5. Louisville Times v. Stivers 252 Ky. 943, 68 S. W. 2d 411 (1934).
6. Comes v. Cruce, 85 Ark. 29, 107 S. W. 185 (1908).
7. McGee v. Collins, 156 La. 291, 100 So. 430 (1924).
8. Noral v. Hearst Publications Inc., 40 Cal. App. 2d 348, 104 P. 2d 860(1940).
9. Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns 475 (N. Y. 1815).
10. Smallwood v' York. 163 Ky. 139, 173 S. W. 380 (1915).
11. Sumner v. Bue, supra.
12. Ibid.
13. Ryckman v. Delevan, 25 Wend. 186 (N. Y. 1840).
14. Ryckman v. Delevan, supra at 199.
15. Fenstermaker v. Tribune Publishing Co., 13 Utah 532, 45 Pac. 1097
(1896).
16. Tobin v. Alfred M. Best Co., 120 App. Div. 387, 105 N. Y. Supp. 294(1st Dept. 1907).
17. Bornman v. Star Co., 174 N. Y. 212, 66 N. E. 723 (1903).
18. Reilly v. Curtis, 53 N. J. 677, 84 A. 199 (1912).
19. Gross v. Cantor, 270 N. Y. 93, 200 N. E. 592 (1903).
20. Kenworthy v. The Journal Co., 117 Mo. App. 327, 336-337, 93 S. W. 882,
885 (1906).
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.Partnerships and corporations, though incapable of experiencing mental pain
from the imputations, have been allowed access to the courts on the grounds that
the disparagement of business integrity and credit tends to inflict pecuniary
harm.21 Massachusetts and New York have even allowed libel suits by non-pro-
fit corporations.2 One case allowed a suit in the name of an unincorporated
association.2
3
CRIMINAL LIBEL
The criminal law of defamation generally applies only to libeL2 4 Libel was
a criminal offense at Common Law.25 Most states now have criminal libel statutes,
typical of which is the New York statute which declares that-
"A malicious publication by writing, printing, picture .... other-
wise than by mere speech, which exposes any living person .... to
hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or which causes .... any person
to be shunned or avoided, or which has the tendency to injure any per-
son, corporation, or association of persons, in his or their business or
occupation, is a libel" '
While civil libel is based upon injury to reputation, the purpose of criminal
libel is to protect society against a breach of the peace.27 The one libeled may re-
sort to physical action,28 or indeed third parties may be incited to resort to vio-
lence against the party libeled.29 The prosecution for the libel of an individual
is not a denial of freedom of speech and press30
21. Bergstrom v. Ridgway-Thayer Co., 53 Misc. 95, 103 N. Y. Supp 1093
(Sup. Ct. 1907), aff'd. 119 App. Div. 89, 105 N. Y. Supp. 1107 (1st Dept. 1907).
See Tannenhaus, supra, n. 3 at 265; Contra: Potter v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. 380,
216 S. W. 886 (1919).
22. Finnish Temperance Society v. Publishing Co., 238 Mass. 345, 130 N. E.
845 (1921). Society for the Suppression of Vice v. Mac Fadden Publications,
260 N. Y. 167, 183 N. E. 284 (1932).
23. Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, 287 N. Y. 373, 39 N. E. 2d 919
(1942).
24. See 2 Wharton, Criminal Law (12th Ed. 1932) sec. 1939.
25. Comm. v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 3 Am. Dec. 212 (1821).
26. New York Penal Law, sec. 1340.
27. Miller, Criminal Law, 492-493 (1934).
28. See Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 Col. L.
Rev. 546, 548, 559 (1903).
29. King v. Osborn, 2 Barn. Y- B. 138 (1732).
30. People v. Doss, 318 Ill. App. 387, 48 N. E. 2d 213, afJ'd. 384 Il. 400, 51
N. E. 2d 517, cert. denied Doss v. People of the State of Illinois, 321 U. S.
789 (1943).
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In order to establish a criminal libel a malicious intent must be shown.3 '
Legal malice here, is not malice in its popular sense viz., hatred and ill will to
the party libeled, but rather connotes an act done wilfully, unlawfully, and in
violation of the just rights of another s2
At common law, and by most statutes today, truth is not an absolute defense
to a criminal libel prosecution. Truth when published with good motives, and
for justifiable ends, i. e., without malice, is a sufficient defense.34 In some states
truth alone is a sufficient defense 3 5 The burden is on the accused to show truth
and freedom from malice,30 or that the communication is privileged. 37 In most
states the jury is the sole judge of the law as well as the facts in a criminal libel
prosecution3 8
There is a conflict of authority whether a libel of a group is subject to
prosecution under the ordinary criminal libel statute. It was said in an early
English case that-
"where a writing which inveighs against mankind in general, or against
a particular order of man as for instance, men of gown, this is no libel
but it must descend to particulars and individuals to make it a libel""
In subsequent cases convictions were obtained where the groups libeled were
"the Jews on Broad Street, '' 40 the Knights of Columbus,41 and the American
Legion.42 Prosecutions were dismissed where the publications attacked "Bohe-
mians," 43 and "the Jews,'44 largely on the grounds that the group was too large
or vague.
31. People v. Hebberd, 96 Misc. 617, 637, 162 N. Y. Supp. 80, 93 (Sup.
Ct. 1916).
32. Comm. v. York, 50 Mass, 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373 (1845).
33. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns Cas. (N. Y.) 337, 395 (1804). Comm v,.
Clap, supra, n. 25; Sachs v. Government of the Canal Zone, 176 F 2d 292 (5 cir.
1949), cert. denied 338 U. S. 858 (1949).
34. People v. Spielman, 318 IIL 482, 149 N. E. 466, 9 (1925); See N. Y.
State Constitution. Art I sec. 8.
35. Leighton v. People, 90 Col. 106, 6P 2d 929 (1931); Morris v. State, 109
Ark. 530. 160 S. W. 387 (1913).
36. Sachs v. Gov't of the Canal Zone, upra, n. 33.
37. State v. Gardner, 151 AtI. 349, 112 Conn. 121 (1930).
38. N. Y. State Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8. People v. Sherlock, 166 N. Y.
180, 183, 59 N. E. 830 (1901).
39. Rex. v. Alme and Nott, 3 Salk 224, 91 Eng. Rep. 790, 1 Ld. Raym. 486,
91 Eng. Rep. 1224 (1700).
40. Rex v. Osborne, 2 Barnardston 138 (1732).
41. People v. Gordon, 63 Cal. App. 62, 219 Pac. 486 (1923).
42. People v. Spielman, supra, n. 34.
43. Drozda v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. 614, 218 S. W. 765 (1920).
44. People v. Edmondson, 168 Misc. 142, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 257 (N. Y. City 1938).
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GROUP LIBEL STATUTES
The reluctance of the courts to allow a civil or criminal action to lie against
one who libeled a large racial or religious group has led to considerable agitation
for group libel legislation. Some states have enacted such statutes of which the
Illinois statute is an example.
"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to manu-
facture, sell .... present, publish or exhibit .... any lithograph, mov-
ing picture, play, drama, or sketch, which publication or exhibition pro-
trays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of
citizens, of any race, color, creed, or religion which said publication or
exhibition exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to con-
tempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace
or riots."45
Two important questions arise in connection with group libel legislation.
One is philosophical, namely, are group libel statutes advisable. The other is
legal, namely, are group libel statutes Constitutional.
THE ADVISABILITY OF GROUP LIBEL LEGISLATION
Those favoring group libel laws contend that group defamation contributes
nothing to the exposition of ideas, and is of no social value.4 6 They also claim
that false and defamatory propaganda against racial and religious groups harms
each member of the group. In Germany, anti-Jewish propaganda eventually re-
sulted in their ostracism from the community, their enslavement, and their murder.
It is further argued that criminal libel is predicated on the tendency toward a
breach of the peace, and it is more likely that there will be a breach of the peace
when a large racial or religious group is defamed.
"Prejudice and hate can't be legislated out of existence, but activ-
ities motivated by prejudice, and hate can be outlawed. When that is
done, the condemnation will attach also to the prejudice and hate that
prompted them." 47
Those opposing group libel laws contend that such a law, no matter how
carefully drafted, would tend to discourage discussion and criticism. It is difficult
45. al. Rev. Stat, 1949, Chap. 38 p. 471.
46. See Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, 150 (1941), where Pro-
fessor Chafee, although not discussing group libel, expresses the view that pro-
fanity and indecent talk and pictures are not protected by the First Amend-
ment because they lack social value.
47. By Att'y Eli Louis Cooper in 92 Cong. Rec. A3679,3680 (1946).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
to draw the line between legitimate expression of opinions, and those views which
tend to create hatred because of opinions on race or religion. 4s Also if improper-
ly applied the law might be used as a sword against the very groups for which
the law was designed to be a shield.
.The publicity caused by a prosecution, furthermore, might be far greater than
that afforded the actual propaganda; and a hate monger if convicted would be a
martyr, if acquitted it would appear to the lay public that his writings met with
judicial approval 49
It was said in the Edmondson case that -
"We must suffer the demagogue and the charlatan in order to make
certain that we do not limit or restrain the honest commentator on pub-
lic affairs." 50
It is interesting to note that several civil liberties groups such as the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish Congress appeared as amici for
the defendant in the Edmondson case.
FREEDOMS OF SPEECH AND PRESS--CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
It was the belief of Blackstone that freedom of the press included only free-
dom from prior restraint.
"The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state, but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications,
and not in freedom from censure for criminal matters when published.
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press;
but if he published what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must
take the consequences of his temerity." 51
In the United States the First and Fourteenth Amendments 52 protect the
press not only from prior restraints,53 but also from subsequent restrictions n
publication,5 4 and from discriminatory taxation. 5 The freedoms of speech and
48. Fraenkel, Our Civil Liberties, 19 (1944).
49. See Tannenhaus, Group Libel, supra, n. 3 at 301.
50. People v. Edmondson, supra, n. 44 at 154, 268.
51. 4 Bl. Corm. 151, 152.
52. U. S. Const., Amend I, Amend. XIV.
53. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
54. Bridges v. Oalifornia, 314 U. S. 252 (1941), Pennekcamp v. Florida, 328
U. S. 331 (1946).
55. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936).
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press are not absolute--"the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or fighting words" are not entitled to protection.O6
If a legislative body in the exercise of its police power desires to require or
-restrict certain types of conduct or speech, and such legislation thereby places
some restraints on free speech or press, in order for that legislation to be upheld
as Constitutional there must be a clear and present danger of some substantive
evil.5 7 In that event the right to express one's ideas is subordinated to the general
welfare of the community.
"Freedom of speech is protected against censorship or punishment,
unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil which rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest." o8
In Gitlow v. New York 59 it was held that the clear and present danger test
did not have to be satisfied where the legislature, instead of forbidding certain
types of conduct, forbids a certain type of speech as harmful and unlawful,(0 but
this is probably not the rule today. Dennis v. United States 61 leads one to believe
that the clear and present danger test must be satisfied whether the legislative re-
striction relates to conduct or speech.62  The clear and present danger test, as
formulated in the Dennis case, is less restrictive than its previous formulations.
The greater the danger, the less clear and imminent need be the danger before
it may be thwarted.
Group libel legislation places a prohibition on certain types of speech, and
a law not requiring a clear and present danger of substantive evil before there
is an arrest probably would be unconstitutional The court, however, would
leave certain discretion as to a determination of the magnitude of the danger
56. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942).
57. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).
58. Terminielo v. City of Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949); See Frankfurter,
J. concurring in Niemotko v. Maryland 340 U. S. 268, 273-289 (1951) for an
analysis of various legislative restrictions, and their treatment by the Supreme
Court.
59. 268 U. S. 652 (1925) where a conviction under a state criminal an-
archism statute was affirmed: The New York Penal Law see. 160, 161 prohibits
overthrow of the government by force. Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357(1927) where a conviction under a state criminal syndicalism statute was af-
firmed.
60. The Constitutional test in this type of case was said to be whether
the legislature could have reasonably concluded that such language created, In
itself, a sufficient danger of substantive evil.
61. 341 U. S. 494 (1951).
62. But see Justice Frankfurter's c6ncurring opinion at 540 where It
was expressed that in cases involving First Amendment freedoms, as In non-
civil liberties cases [see United States v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U. S. 144(1938) 3, great discretion must be given to legislative judgments as to how
best to reconcile competing interests.
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and the social desireability of its restriction to the legislature. The danger would
have to be of some serious substantive evil such as an imminent threat of a
riot, rather than mere hurt feelings on the part of the libeled group.
If it is found that group libel, like the libel of an individual, is per se not
subject to First Amendment protection then the clear and present danger test
would not have to be met. In Terminiello v. City of Chicago63 the court in-
cluded "the libelous" in the area of non-protected speech. Also in Cantwell v.
Connecticut 64 it was said that-
"Resorts to epitfxets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitu-
tion, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question
under that instrument."
GROUP LIBEL LEGISLATION-VAGUENESS
The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that criminal laws be free from vagueness and uncertainty. The law must ap-
praise the reasonable person of the type of conduct which is prohibited.65 The
statute must furnish a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt.66 In Lanzetta
v. New Jersey,6 a New Jersey "gangster" statute was declared repugnant to the
Fourteenth Amendment due to its vagueness and uncertainty. In Fox v. Wash-
ington,68 a statute making it a crime to print . . . . etc. matter advocating or
encouraging the commission of any crime or breach of the peace was held not
too vague after the state court had placed a restrictive interpretation on the
statute.
A criminal group libel law would also have to be free from vagueness
and uncertainty. In State v. Klapprott,69 a New Jersey "race hatred" statute
making it a misdemeanor to make statements inciting, promoting or advocating
hatred, abuse, violence or hostility against any group of persons because of race,
color, religion, or manner of worship was declared unconstitutional The court
said that the words "hatred, hostility, and abuse" were too broad, abstract, and
indefinite.7° A statute which would make "any libel of a group" a crime would
63. Supra, n. 58 at 4.
64. 310 U. S. 296, 309-310 (1940).
65. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948).66. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937).
67. 306 U. S. 451 (1939).
68. 236 U. S. 273 (1915).
69. 127 N. J. L. 395, 22A 2d 877 (1941).
70. ibid. at 402; at 881.
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probably meet the vagueness test in that there is a Common Law idea of what
is a libel 71
PEOPLE v. BEAUHARNAIS
The Constitutionality of the Illinois Group Libel statute 2 now rests in
the hands of the United States Supreme Court. Joseph Beauharnais, the Presi-
dent of the White Circle League of America,7 3 was charged and convicted of
publishing lithographs which portrayed depravity, criminality, unchastity, and
lack of virtue in the Negro race which exposed Negroes to contempt, derision,
and obloquy. The Illinois Supreme Court called the defendant's writings "fight-
ing words"74 liable to cause violence and disorder between the races, and af-
firmed the conviction. (Fighting words, those calculated to cause a breach of
the peace, are not entitled to free speech and press protection 5 ) The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, 6 and has heard the oral arguments. 7
The State of Illinois in support of the statute contends that writings like
those of the defendant tend to cause discrimination in public places due to
color, (a substantive evil in fllinois78 ) and bring about riots and other breaches
of the peace. The Springfield riots of 1908, and the recent Cicero riots were
pointed to, in order to show that the Illinois legislature could reasonably have
found that group libel was a very substantial danger to the community in that
it could eventually bring about such riots. The ends to be attained being de-
sirable, it should only be the court's function to determine if the means de-
signed to attain the ends are reasonable. They further contended that the statute
adequately informed the public of that which was made criminal.
The American Civil Liberties Union appeared as counsel for Beauharnais.
They expressed their abhorrence of the views expressed in the defendant's publi-
cation, and made it clear that the Union was fighting only for the defendant's
right to publish his views. The A. C. L U. contended that the statute did not
meet the clear and present danger test, and was, therefore, unconstitutional. They
claimed that the defendant was convicted under that part of the statute which
71. White v. Nicholls, 44 U. S. 266 (1845). Cf. Winters v. New York, supra,
n. 65 where there was no Common Law idea of "lewd and lascivious matter."
72. Ill. Rev. Stats. supra, n. 45.
73. A corporation that lost its corporate charter in a quo warranto pro-
ceedings. The Illinois court holding that the Constitutional guarantee of free
speech doesn't authorize violation of a corporate charter. 408 Ill. 564, 97 N. E.
2d 811 (1951).
74. People v. Beauharnais, 408 Ill. 512 97 N. E. 2d 343,6 (1951).
75. Chaplinsy vo. New Hampshire, supra, n. 56.
76. 72 S. Ct. 39 (1951).
77. 20 U. S. L. Week, 3141.
78. IM. Rev. Stats. 1951, chap. 38, pp 1342-1343.
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made it a crime to portray depravity, etc., in a race and thereby subject that
race to contempt, derision and obloquy -not that part of the statute which makes
the same writings criminal if they are productive of breach of the peace or
riots. 70 The A. C. L. U. also contended that the statute was vague, that it could
be applied to writings attacking the Chinese Communists as liars, pagans, and
ungodly, or to the writings of a professor making a race study, etc.
CONCLUSION
The particular Group Libel statute now being scrutinized by the Supreme
Court might fall due to its general vagueness and indefiniteness. It might also
fall due to the fact that part of the statute makes it a crime to publish cer-
tain types of writings even when those writings are not calculated to create a dear
and present danger of a breach of the peace. That would not necessarily mean that
a constitutional law could not be drafted. A law free from vagueness, which makes
it a crime to libel a racial or religious group when such a libel would tend to create
a breach of the peace could probably be sustained. Logically if the libel of an in-
dividual does not come within the protection of free speech and press, the libel-
ant should not be able to escape punishment by multiplying the number of
persons vilified and by identifying them by a collective term.
It is one thing to say that a Group Libel statute valid in law could be
drafted, and another thing to determine if such a law should be drafted. The lat
ter determination is a matter of personal judgment. The right of a group to be
free from virulent attacks based only on the color of their skin or the way they
pray to God, and the right of the individual to express his views unafraid of crim-
inal prosecution, whether his views be popular or unpopular, both rank high on
our social scale. When an issue is between a right and a wrong, it presents no
dilemma. "The dilemma is because the conflict is between two rights, each in its
own way important."' 0
Alvin M. Glick
79. See n. 45, supra. Note the or in the statute (or which is productive
of breach of the peace or riots.)
80. Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, I Bflo.
L. Rev. 103, 117 (1951).
